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Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges After Batson v. 
Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama: An Equal Protection 
and First Amendment Analysis 
Benjamin Hoorn Barton 
INTRODUCTION 
During voir-direl examination in a criminal trial, the prosecutor 
notices that a black venire person is wearing a cross., Without ask-
ing any further questions, the prosecutor uses one of her peremp-
tory challenges2 to remove this venire person from the jury panel. 
In response to this strike, the defense counsel raises an objection 
under Batson v. Kentucky3 that the peremptory challenge is race-
based and therefore impermissible. The court asks the prosecutor 
to state a race-neutral explanation for the challenge. The prosecu-
tor explains that the defendant is Christian and that the venire per-
son may be biased. 
This explanation is likely to be found legitimate under current 
law. Batson and its progeny eliminated race-based peremptory 
challenges, but courts have generally limited Batson to race and 
1. A jury is selected from the venire - a panel of prospective jurors - and voir dire is 
the questioning process used in the selection of jurors. "[I]t is necessary to select from the 
panel of prospective jurors those individuals who will actually serve as jurors in [the] case. 
The examination of prospective jurors for this purpose is commonly referred to as the voir 
dire .•.. " 2 WAYNER.LAFAVE & JEROID H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.3, at 718 
(1985). 
2. Challenges for cause and peremptory challenges are the two methods of preventing a 
potential juror from being impanelled. "Challenges for cause, the Supreme Court has noted, 
'permit rejection of jurors on narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable bases of 
partiality.' Both the defense and the prosecution may challenge an unlimited number of 
jurors for cause .... Usually, not many prospective jurors are lost in this way." 2 LAFAVE & 
ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 21.3, at 728 (1985) (footnote omitted) (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 
380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965)). Peremptory challenges, however, formerly were "exercised with-
out a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control." Swain, 
380 U.S. at 220. However, the Supreme Court cases of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 
(1985), and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994), among others, have cur-
tailed the arbitrary nature of the peremptory challenge by ruling that it is unconstitutional to 
remove potential jurors solely on the basis of race (Batson) or sex (J.E.B.). 
3. 476 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1985). Batson held that race-based peremptory challenges violate 
the rights of the defendant and the potential juror: "The Equal Protection Clause guarantees 
the defendant that the State will not exclude members of his race from the jury venire on 
account of race . . . . [B]y denying a person participation in jury service on account of his 
race, the State unconstitutionally discriminated against the excluded juror.'' 476 U.S. at 86-
87. 
Once a litigant objects to a peremptory challenge as unconstitutional under Batson, the 
striking party must give a race-neutral explanation for the challenge. For a discussion of this 
procedure and Batson in general, see infra text accompanying notes 13-22. 
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permitted religion-based peremptories.4 Courts have allowed per-
emptory challenges of black potential jurors5 because of the juror's 
"fringe religious group preference,"6 the juror's choice to "omit[ ] 
an answer to the religious preference question on the juror informa-
tion card,"7 and on the basis that the juror "carried a Bible."8 In all 
of these cases, the lawyer who exercised the peremptory challenge 
failed to present any connection between the potential juror's reli-
gious affiliation and the case at hand, nor was there any information 
about the potential juror's specific beliefs. 
The analysis relied upon by these courts must be reassessed, 
however, in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in J.E.B. v. Ala-
bama ex rel. T.B.,9 which extended Batson's protections to gender-
based peremptory challenges. J.E.B. opens the question whether 
Batson should be extended further to eliminate religion-based per-
emptory challenges. At present there is a split in authority concern-
ing the constitutionality of religion-based peremptory challenges.10 
4. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 769-71 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 
2120 (1994); State v. Lundgren, Nos. 90-L-15-140, 91-L-036, 1993 WL 346444, at *39 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1993), affd., 653 N.E.2d 304 (1995). 
5. This Note uses "venire person" and "potential juror" interchangeably. 
6. Chambers v. State, 724 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. Ct. App.1987). The religious groups at 
issue were the Church of Christ and the Jehovah's Witnesses. 724 S.W.2d at 442. 
7. Grady v. State, 730S.W.2d191, 195 (Tex. Ct. App.1987), vacated, 761S.W.2d19 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1988). 
8. State v. Worthy, 532 So. 2d 541, 553 (La. Ct. App. 1988). 
9. 114 s. Ct. 1419 (1994). 
10. Only one case has squarely held that under Batson and J.E.B. religion-based peremp-
tory challenges are unconstitutional. See Casarez v. State, No. 1114-93, 1994 WL 695868 
(Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 1994) (en bane). One federal circuit court has intimated in dicta 
that Batson extends to religion. See United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1086 n.9 (5th Cir. 
1991), vacated in part on rehg. en bane, 968 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 
1390 (1993). 
The Third Circuit, however, has allowed religion as a race-neutral explanation for a Bat-
son objection. United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1157 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
496 U.S. 927 (1990). Numerous state courts have ruled similarly. See, e.g., People v. Malone, 
570 N.E.2d 584, 588-89 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 584 N.E.2d 135 (Ill. 1991) (allowing a 
strike because religion played a major role in the juror's life); State v. Worthy, 532 So. 2d 541, 
553 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (allowing a strike because the juror carried a Bible); State v. Davis, 
504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994); Johnson v. State, 529 So. 2d 
577, 583 (Miss. 1988) (allowing dismissal of a juror because of "non-committal" responses to 
religious questions); State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 64 (Mo. 1987) (stating that in exercis-
ing peremptory challenges "[c]ounsel must rely upon perceptions of attitudes based upon 
demeanor, gender ••• religion, and many other fundamental background facts"). 
Some state courts have eliminated certain types of peremptory challenges of potential 
jurors under their state constitutions. See People v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561, 574 (Cal. 1990) 
(holding that peremptories based on an identifiable group, such as race or religion, violate 
the state constitution); Fields v. People, 732 P.2d 1145, 1153 n.15 (Colo. 1987) (noting deci-
sions of other state courts); Joseph v. State, 636 So. 2d 777, 780-81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) 
(holding the peremptory challenge of Jews unconstitutional under the state constitution); 
State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845, 850 (Haw. 1990) (holding gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges unconstitutional); Commonwealth v. Carleton, 629 N.E.2d 321, 325 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1993) (holding peremptory challenges based on bias inferred from membership in a discrete 
community group unconstitutional); State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150, 1154 (N.J. 1986) (hold-
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This Note argues that under Batson, J.E.B., the First Amend-
ment,11 and the Equal Protection Clause, 12 religion-based peremp-
tory challenges are unconstitutional. This Note asserts that the 
analysis of governmental religious discrimination, such as a per-
emptory challenge, is the same under either the First Amendment 
or the Equal Protection Clause because both apply strict scrutiny to 
purposeful government discrimination. 
Part I examines Batson and J.E.B. in greater detail and states a 
model for analyzing discriminatory peremptory challenges in which 
such challenges are treated as intentional governmental discrimina-
tion subject to heightened scrutiny. Part II argues that under the 
First Amendment, intentional governmental religious discrimina-
tion, such as a peremptory challenge, is strictly scrutinized. Part III 
asserts that strict scrutiny is applied to religious discrimination 
under the Equal Protection Clause as well. Part IV applies the 
strict scrutiny standard to religion-based peremptory challenges and 
concludes that such challenges are not narrowly tailored and there-
fore are unconstitutional. Part V addresses the practical difficulties 
involved in finding religion-based peremptory challenges unconsti-
tutional and argues that they are not significant enough to preserve 
the use of religion-based peremptory challenges. 
I. THE BATSON-J.EB. MODEL 
In assessing the constitutionality of religion-based peremptory 
challenges, it is important first to understand the Court's precedents 
concerning race- and gender-based peremptory challenges and the 
Court's general approach under the Equal Protection Clause. Sec-
tion I.A argues that Batson did not apply traditional equal protec-
tion analysis and left the possibility of expanding Batson beyond 
race unclear. Section I.B argues that the cases following Batson es-
ing peremptory challenges based solely on membership in a cognizable group 
unconstitutional). 
There is also a split among recent commentators. Compare J. Suzanne Bell Chambers, 
Note, Applying the Break: Religion and the Peremptory Challenge, 70 IND. L.J. 569 (1995) 
(arguing religion·based peremptory challenges are constitutional) with Angela J. Mason, 
Note, Discrimination Based on Religious Affiliation: Another Nail in the Peremptory Chal-
lenge's Coffin?, 29 GA. L. REv. 493 (1995) (arguing the opposite) and David G. Hart & 
Russell D. Cawyer, Batson and its Progeny Prohibit the Use of Peremptory Challenges Based 
Upon Disability and Religion: A Practitioner's Guide for Requesting a Civil Batson Hearing, 
26 TEX. TECH L. REv. 109 (1995) (arguing the same from a Texas practitioner's point of 
view). 
11. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .•.. " U.S. CoNST. amend. I. 
12. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV,§ 1. 
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tablish that peremptory challenges are subject to traditional equal 
protection analysis and that J.E.B. sets the model for such analysis. 
A. Batson and Traditional Equal Protection Jurisprudence 
Batson did not apply traditional equal protection analysis to 
race-based peremptory challenges. Batson departed from tradi-
tional equal protection analysis in two ways. First, Batson created a 
unique structure for establishing intentional governmental discrimi-
nation in the use of peremptory challenges, and second, once inten-
tional discrimination was established, Batson did not apply strict 
scrutiny to race-based peremptories. 
Batson's treatment of peremptory challenges was unusual be-
cause of the mechanism the Court used to establish purposeful gov-
ernment discrimination. Under traditional equal protection 
analysis, the Court requires proof of intentional discrimination to 
invalidate government race discrimination.13 To find intentional 
discrimination, the Court usually differentiates between govern-
ment acts that facially discriminate14 and government acts that are 
facially neutral but have a disparate impact1s upon a racial group. 
If an act is facially discriminatory, the Court infers intent to discrim-
inate.16 If the government act is facially neutral but disparately im-
pacts a racial group, the Court requires a separate showing of 
intent.17 Batson never stated whether race-based peremptory chal-
lenges constituted facial discrimination.1s 
13. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264·65 (1977) 
("Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause."); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1976). 
14. A government act facially discriminates if it explicitly singles out a group for different 
treatment. The antimiscegenation law struck down in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), is 
an example of facial discrimination. 
15. If a government act does not facially classify according to race but disproportionately 
affects one racial group, it is said to have disparate impact. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 
265-66. An example of disparate impact is a government job test that disproportionately 
eliminates black candidates. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 232-33. 
16. See Personnel Admr. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) ("A racial classification, 
regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an 
extraordinary justification."); cf. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (describing the standard 
for establishing invidious intent for legislation which is "neutral on its face"). 
17. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265. This focus on discriminatory intent has been 
widely criticized. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-20, 
at 1509-10 (2d ed. 1988); Gayle Binion, "Intent" and Equal Protection: A Reconsideration, 
1983 SuP. CT. REv. 397; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflection on Sex Equality Under Law, 
100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1321 n.170 (1991). 
18. Peremptory challenges are not facially discriminatory. A peremptory challenge can 
be used to strike potential jurors of any race for any reason. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 
202, 221-22 (1965) ("In the quest for an impartial and qualified jury, Negro and white, Protes-
tant and Catholic, are alike subject to being challenged without cause."). Although the use 
of the peremptory challenge has had a disparate impact on minorities, a showing of disparate 
impact is insufficient proof of intentional discrimination. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 239-42 (using 
jury selection cases as support for requiring a separate showing of intent beyond a showing of 
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Instead, Batson stated a three-part test to establish purposeful 
discrimination in the use of a peremptory challenge.19 First, the de-
fendant must establish a prim.a facie case of race discrimination.20 
Then the burden shifts to the prosecutor to state a race-neutral ex-
planation.21 Finally, the trial court must determine whether the 
peremptory challenge is race-based and improper.22 
disparate impact). Therefore, intentional discrimination must be demonstrated before a per-
emptory challenge can be invalidated. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 ("[The] 'invidious quality' 
of governmental action claimed to be racially discriminatory 'must ultimately be traced to a 
racially discriminatory purpose."' (quoting Davis, 426 U.S. at 240)). Prior to Batson, a show-
ing of purposeful discrimination was practically impossible because the peremptory challenge 
had been wholly unexplained. 
In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), the Court attempted to eliminate race-based 
peremptory challenges and leave the peremptory challenge unexplained. Swain required the 
defendant to prove a systematic history of racial discrimination by a prosecutor in order to 
invalidate any peremptory challenge as racially discriminatory. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220-22. 
At the same time, Swain refused to force litigants to explain any particular peremptory chal-
lenge. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220-22. Swain's burden of proof proved crippling, however, and 
Swain was widely criticized as an ineffective remedy for discriminatory peremptory chal-
lenges. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 510 n.12 (Mass. 1979), cert de-
nied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979) ("In light of the extensive criticism of Swain, and in recognition of 
the negligible protection that decision offers to a defendant asserting the right to trial by jury 
of peers, we take this opportunity to depart from applying its rule perfunctorily .•.. "); State 
v. Crespin, 612 P.2d 716, 717 (N.M. a. App. 1980) ("[T]he challenge allowed in Swain may 
be too limited .... [T]he California experience with the Swain rule has resulted in numerous 
attempts to meet the Swain burden with no success •... " (citations omitted)); Albert W. 
Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Re-
view of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 153, 164 (1989) ("Under Swain, the Constitution 
guaranteed minorities only an opportunity to reach the finals before a government officer 
discriminated against them."); Mary A. Lynch, The Application of Equal Protection to Pro-
spective Jurors with Disabilities: Will Batson Cover Disability Based Strikes?, 57 ALB. L. REv. 
289, 306-09 {1993) {describing Swain as "powerful in principle, pathetic in practice"); John 
Andrew Martin, The Fifth Circuit and Jury Selection Cases: The Negro Defendant and his 
Peerless Jury, 4 Haus. L. REv. 448 (1966); Note, Fair Jury Selection Procedures, 75 YALE LJ. 
322 (1965); Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the All-White Jury, 
52 VA. L. REv. 1157 (1966); Note, Peremptory Challenge - Systematic Exclusion of Prospec-
tive Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 Miss. LJ. 157 (1967). 
19. This three-part test overturned Swain's "crippling burden of proof," Batson, 416 U.S. 
at 92-94, and allowed litigants to prove invidious intent in the use of a specific peremptory 
challenge, Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-96. The Court's decision to adopt a unique three-part test 
rather than to rely on the traditional categories of facial discrimination and disparate impact 
may be evidence that these categories do not effectively reveal invidious discrimination. See 
generally MacKinnon, supra note 17. 
20. Under Batson, a prima facie case is established by proving that the excluded juror and 
the criminal defendant are members of a cognizable racial group and by proving "any other 
relevant circumstances." Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. Such circumstances might include a pattern 
of strikes against black jurors or the prosecutor's questions during voir dire. Batson, 476 U.S. 
at 97. 
Note that Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), eliminated the requirement that the de-
fendant and the struck juror be of the same race. 
21. For a full discussion of race-neutral explanations, see Michael J. Raphael & Edward J. 
Ungvarsky, Excuses, Excuses: Neutral Explanations Under Batson v. Kentucky, 27 U. MICH. 
J.L. REF. 229 (1993). 
22. Batson states: 
[A] defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection 
of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory 
challenges at the defendant's trial. 
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The second Batson Equal Protection Clause irregularity is that 
the Court never applied strict scrutiny23 after establishing a frame-
work for finding intentional discrimination. Under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, the Court applies strict scrutiny to intentional 
discrimination prior to invalidation.24 Once Batson created a 
framework to find intentional discrimination, strict scrutiny should 
have been applied.25 Because of these irregularities, it was unclear 
whether Batson should be analyzed as part of the Court's equal 
protection tradition and, if so, whether it could be expanded be-
yond race.26 
B. The J.B.B. Model for Assessing Religion-Based Peremptory 
Challenges 
The cases that followed Batson clarified its ambiguous relation-
ship to the Equal Protection Clause. These cases did three things. 
First, they expanded Batson, which addressed only prosecutorial 
peremptories in criminal trials, to race-based peremptory chal-
lenges by nongovernment litigants and to civil trials.27 Second, they 
Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to 
come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors .... [T]he prosecu-
tor's explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause •••• 
The trial court then will have the duty to determine if the defendant has established 
purposeful discrimination. 
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98. 
Note that the Court recently held that proving that the race-neutral explanation is a pre-
text, without an affirmative showing of intent to discriminate, is insufficient under Batson. 
Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995). 
23. Strict scrutiny requires that a government act must serve a legitimate purpose and be 
''narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose." Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 
267, 279-80 (1986). 
24. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-97 (1989). 
25. Chief Justice Burger noted this equal protection irregularity in his dissent: "The 
Court never applies this conventional equal protection framework to the claims at hand, 
perhaps to avoid acknowledging that the state interest involved here has historically been 
regarded by this Court as substantial, if not compelling." Batson, 476 U.S. at 125 (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting). 
26. Chief Justice ~urger, in his Batson dissent, was the first to state that Batson was not a 
traditional equal protection case and that Batson was limited to race: 
That the Court is not applying conventional equal protection analysis is shown by its 
limitation of its new rule to allegations of impermissible challenge on the basis of race 
.... But if conventional equal protection principles apply, then presumably defendants 
could object to exclusions on the basis of not only race, but also sex, age, religious or 
political affiliation .... 
Batson, 476 U.S. at 123-24 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Later courts picked 
up on this language and refused to extend Batson to religion. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 504 
N.W.2d 767, 769-71(Minn.1993), cert. denied, 114 S. a. 2120 (1994); Lundgren v. Ohio, Nos. 
90-L-15-140, 91-L-036, 1993 WL 346444, at *39 (Ohio a. App. Sept. 14, 1993). 
27. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), first expanded Batson to criminal defendants of 
any race. Next, in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), the Court ex-
tended Batson to jury selection in civil trials. The question- in Edmonson was whether per-
emptory challenges by private litigants, as opposed to a state prosecutor, could be state 
action subject to the strictures of equal protection. The Court decided that private attorneys 
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established that potential jurors themselves have an equal protec-
tion right to nondiscriminatory jury-selection procedures.28 
Third, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. established that Batson is 
not limited to race and that traditional Equal Protection principles 
are applicable to the peremptory challenge. In J.E.B., the Court 
applied "equal protection jurisprudence" to extend Batson to gen-
der.w The Court applied intermediate scrutiny3o to peremptory 
challenges on the basis of gender31 and held that such peremptories 
were unconstitutional.32 J.E.B. followed Batson in applying a 
are state actors in selecting juries, stating tbat peremptory challenges involve "overt, signifi-
cant participation of tbe government," tbat peremptories perform "a traditional function of 
tbe government," and tbat the injury caused by discriminatory peremptory challenges is 
"more severe because the government permits it to occur witbin tbe courthouse itself." Ed-
monson, 500 U.S. at 620-28. 
Lastly, Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 {1992), extended Batson to race-based peremp-
tory challenges by criminal defendants. Mccollum completed tbe Court's goal of eliminating 
race-based peremptory challenges by extending Batson to virtually all jury-trial settings. 
28. McCol/um, 505 U.S. at 48 ("[D]enying a person participation in jury service on ac-
count of his race unconstitutionally discriminates against tbe excluded juror."); Edmonson, 
500 U.S. at 618 ("[R]ace-based peremptory challenge[s] violate[] tbe equal protection rights 
of those excluded from jury service."); Powers, 499 U.S. at 409 ("An individual juror does not 
have a right to sit on any particular petit jury, but he or she does possess tbe right not to be 
excluded from one on account of race."); see also Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Dis-
crimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It Anyway?, 92 CowM. L. REv. 725 (1992). 
29. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1425 (1994). J.E.B. dealt witb a pater-
nity suit by tbe State of Alabama on the behalf of a single motber. During jury selection, tbe 
state used nine of ten peremptory challenges to strike men, resulting in an all-female jury. 
114 S. Ct. at 1421-22. 
30. "[G]ender-based classifications require 'an exceedingly persuasive justification' in or-
der to survive constitutional scrutiny." J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425 (quoting Personnel Admr. v. 
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)). 
Under tbe Equal Protection Clause, tbe Supreme Court applies tbree separate standards 
of review: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review. Strict scrutiny is 
applied to inherently suspect classifications, such as racial classifications. See, e.g., Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279-80 (1986). Gender has never been found to be an 
inherently suspect classification and therefore receives intermediate scrutiny. See J.E.B., 114 
S. Ct. at 1425 n.6 (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,458 U.S. 718, 724n.9 (1982)). 
Government acts which burden a fundamental right are also strictly scrutinized. See San 
Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411U.S.1, 31-33 (1973). All otber types of govern-
ment classifications are reviewed under "rational basis review." See, e.g., Pennell v. City of 
San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14 {1988) {holding tbat government classifications must be " 'rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest'" (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 
(1976))). 
31. Note that J.E.B. 's application of intermediate scrutiny settles tbe essential Batson 
equal protection irregularity. Once intentional discrimination is established, traditional 
equal protection jurisprudence is applied, and tbe Court applies tbe appropriate level of scru-
tiny. Intermediate scrutiny is applied to gender; strict scrutiny is applied to religion. See 
infra Parts II and III. 
32. The Court stated: 
Equal opportunity to participate in tbe fair administration of justice is fundamental 
to our democratic system. It not only furthers tbe goals of tbe jury system. It reaffirms 
the promise of equality under tbe law - tbat all citizens, regardless of race, ethnicity, or 
gender, have tbe chance to take part directly in our democracy. 
J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430. 
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three-part test for establishing intentional gender discrimination in 
the use of a peremptory challenge.33 
J.E.B. sets the model for assessing the constitutionality of per-
emptory challenges. Individual jurors have a right to non-
discrimination in jury selection procedures. The Batson three-part 
test is used to establish the requisite showing of discriminatory in-
tent. If a peremptory challenge is used to exclude groups protected 
by the Equal Protection Clause, it is analyzed under traditional 
equal protection principles, and heightened scrutiny is applied. 
II. STRICT SCRUTINY UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
In order to assess the constitutionality of religion-based peremp-
tory challenges, it is necessary to establish the level of scrutiny ap-
plied to government acts which discriminate on the basis of religion. 
Part II argues that under the First Amendment, governmental reli-
gious discrimination must be strictly scrutinized. Part III argues 
that under traditional equal protection jurisprudence, governmental 
religious discrimination must be strictly scrutinized. ~s Note first 
analyzes religious discrimination under the First Amendment be-
cause the Equal Protection Clause offers no new constitutional 
rights: instead, it requires states to protect other constitutional 
rights held by their citizens. Therefore, an understanding of the 
First Amendment implications of religion-based peremptory chal-
lenges must precede any equal protection analysis. 
Part II.A argues that under either the Free Exercise Clause or 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, intentional gov-
ernmental religious discrimination is subject to strict scrutiny under 
an analysis which is similar to equal protection jurisprudence. The 
Court searches for antireligious animus, relying on the familiar cat-
egories of facial discrimination and disparate impact. If intentional 
discrimination is found, the Court applies strict scrutiny. Part II.B 
argues that strict scrutiny is especially appropriate for religion-
based peremptory challenges because the Court has repeatedly 
stated the need for government neutrality in the selection of gov-
ernment officials. 
A. Intentional Government Religious Discrimination Under the 
First Amendment 
This section argues that the analysis of government religious dis-
crimination is the same under either clause of the First Amend-
ment: the Court searches for intentional discrimination and applies 
33. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429-30. 
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strict scrutiny to such discrimination.34 The First Amendment 
states "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "35 The Court 
has generally separated the amendment into the Establishment 
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Governmental religious dis-
crimination violates both clauses of the First Amendment. Under 
both clauses, the Court has repeatedly ruled that the government 
must remain neutral among religions.36 When the government dis-
criminates on the basis of religion, it violates this constitutional 
mandate. Free exercise of religion is abridged because the govern-
ment is treating a group of persons differently on the basis of their 
free exercise rights. The Establishment Clause is violated because 
in discriminating against one religious group the government is es-
tablishing another.37 The primary First Amendment violation in-
volved in governmental religious discrimination is the violation of 
government religious neutrality. Consequently, both clauses are 
applicable. 
There are three levels of scrutiny that are presently applied to 
violations of the First Amendment. The highest level of scrutiny, 
which can be called absolute protection, states that "a law targeting 
religious belief as such is never permissible .... "38 Any govern-
mental act which explicitly targets religious belief is per se invalid. 
The second level of scrutiny applied is strict scrutiny. Under strict 
scrutiny the government act "must be justified by a compelling gov-
ernmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that 
interest."39 Government acts which facially discriminate on the ba-
34. This Note also argues that this same analysis applies under the Equal Protection 
Clause. See infra text accompanying notes 61-79. This Note, therefore, argues for a unified 
standard for assessing the constitutionality of governmental religious discrimination. See in-
fra text accompanying notes 80-81. This is not to suggest that these bodies of law are identi-
cal or that all constitutional questions regarding religion should be treated the same. 
35. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
36. Compare Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2491 (1994) (stating that the 
Establishment Clause requires governmental religious neutrality) with Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2234 (1993) ("The Free Exercis~ Clause 
commits government itself to religious tolerance ...• "); see also Michael W. McConnell & 
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. Cm. L. 
REv. 1, 10-12 (1989) (arguing for governmental religious neutrality as a "baseline" for the 
First Amendment). 
The Court has also recognized that the two clauses are "interrelat[ed]" and "complemen-
tary'' in " 'secur[ing] religious liberty from the invasion of the civil authority.' " Everson v. 
Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (citations omitted). 
37. For example, if the government were to ban the religious practices of minority reli-
gions, it would essentially establish the majority religion as the government's religion of 
choice. 
38. Lukum~ 113 S. Ct at 2227 (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978)). As an 
example of such a law, the Court has used a prohibition on "bowing down before a golden 
calf." See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990). 
39. Lukum~ 113 S. Ct. at 2226. 
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sis of religion are strictly scrutinized under either clause of the Frrst 
Amendment.40 
The lowest level of scrutiny is rational basis.41 Under the 
Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 42 government 
acts that are neutral and generally applicable, but that affect reli-
gious practice, receive rational basis review.43 Prior to Smith, the 
level of review for such "neutral" acts was unclear; the Court some-
times applied strict scrutiny44 and sometimes rational basis re-
40. For a Free Exercise Clause example, see Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2233. For an Estab-
lishment Clause example, see Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246-47 (1982). 
41. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-80 (1990} (holding that the First 
Amendment does not exempt religious adherents from a "neutral, generally applicable regu-
latory law"). 
42. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Smith dealt with a claim by members of the Native American 
Church that Oregon's criminal drug statutes unconstitutionally curtailed their free exercise 
right to sacramental use of peyote. See 494 U.S. at fr75. 
43. 494 U.S. at 878-79. The Smith decision has been widely criticized. See Lukumi, 113 S. 
Ct. at 2240-50 (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing for a reexamination of Smith}; Michael W. 
McConneU, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 1109 
(1990) [hereinafter McConnel1, Free Exercise Revisionism] (stating that Smith has little 
grounding in authority and diminishes the status of free exercise); Steven D. Smith, The Rise 
and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 231-37 
(1991); Eddie Lam, Note, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Ore-
gon v. Smith: The Limits of the Free Exercise Clause, 16 T. MARsHALL L. REv. 377 (1991). 
In response to Smith, and in· an effort to restore strict scrutiny review, Congress passed 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"). Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1993)). 
The Act's stated purpose is: "To restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert 
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee 
its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened •.•• " 42 
U.S.C. § 2000bb(b}(l}. The "compelling interest test" of Sherbert and Yoder is a strict scru-
tiny standard: Government action may substantially burden an individual's free exercise of 
religion only if the government demonstrates that the action furthers a compelling govern-
mental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. For a discussion 
of the RFRA, see Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the 
Limits of Legislative Power, 73 TEXAS L. REv. 247 (1994), and Leon F. Szetpycki & Jean B. 
Arnold, Commentary: Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 88 Enuc. L. REP. 907 (1994). 
Professor McConnell argues that the law may be unconstitutional depending on the Court's 
reading of the Fust Amendment: 
If citizens have the right to practice their religion subject only to the government's over-
riding need to protect peace and safety, then Congress can use Section Five of the Four-
teenth Amendment to enforce that right .••• 
. . • If citizens do not have an inherent right to have their religious beliefs accommo-
dated, then the power of Congress to make such a law is less clear. 
Michael W. McConnell, Should Congress Pass Legislation Restoring the Broader Interpreta-
tion of Free Exercise of Religion?, 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 181, 187-88 (1992) (emphasis 
omitted). 
Furthermore, Congress does not have the power to change the Court's treatment of the 
First Amendment. Therefore, Congress' action does not affect "cases under the Free Exer-
cise Clause; it applies only to cases brought under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act." 
Szetpycki & Arnold, supra, at 915. 
44. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215 ("[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those 
not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."); 
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (holding that a burden on the free exercise of religion must be 
justified by a "compelling state interest"). 
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view.45 Smith explicitly did not alter the level of review. for 
government acts that facially discriminate, reaffirming numerous 
precedents and stating that the Court "strictly scrutinize[s] govern-
mental classifications based on religion."46 
The distinction drawn by Smith between facial and neutral gov-
ernment acts for the First Amendment brings the Court's treatment 
of religion into conformity with its treatment of race and sex under 
the Equal Protection Clause. The level of scrutiny applied depends 
upon a finding of intentional discrimination and on the categories 
of facial discrimination and disparate impact.47 Smith explicitly rec-
ognizes the parallel: 
Just as we subject to the most exacting scrutiny laws that make classi-
fications based on race ... so too we strictly scrutinize governmental 
classifications based on religion. But, we have held that race-neutral 
laws that have the effect of disproportionately disadvantaging a par-
ticular racial group do not thereby become subject to compelling-
interest analysis under the Equal Protection Clause . . . . Our conclu-
sion that generally applicable, religion neutral laws that have the ef-
45. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439, 450-51 
(1988) (holding that incidental effects of government programs that make it more difficult to 
practice certain religions do not require compelling justification); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 
693, 706-07 (1986) (holding that a lower standard exists for indirect government burdens on 
religious practices); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 506-07 (1986) (holding that mili-
tary regulations are subject to a less stringent First Amendment standard). 
46. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3 (citations omitted); see also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 
246-47 (1981) (holding that a government rule that grants denominational preferences "must 
be invalidated unless justified by a compelling governmental interest and unless it is closely 
fitted to further that interest"); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1438 (1994) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (subjecting religious classifications to "heightened scrutiny"); Davis v. 
Minnesota, 114 S. Ct. 2120, 2121 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same). 
Note that although Smith and the later decision, Lukum~ both state that strict scrutiny is 
to be applied to purposeful religious discrimination there is some confusion about what this 
exactly means. Professor Steven Smith has suggested that under Lukumi and Smith, the 
government act must be motivated by an intent to persecute a particular religious faith. See 
Steven D. Smith, Free Exercise Doctrine and the Discourse of Disrespect, 65 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 519, 558-61 (1994). Professor Abner Greene formulated the test in terms of an intent 
to "burden religion." See Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 
YALE L.J. 1611, 1612 n.9 (1993). Professor Michael McConnell read Smith to require "delib-
erate discrimination against religion." See McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 
43, at 1111. This Note's reading of Lukumi and Smith as creating a religion model which 
parallels the equal protection model contradicts Professor Smith's conclusion that intent to 
persecute is necessary to prove purposeful discrimination. A showing that the act purpose-
fully targets religious conduct or affiliation should be sufficient. But cf. id. at 1137-41 (argu-
ing that Smith's reliance on equal protection cases ill suits free exercise jurisprudence). 
47. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. Note that Smith's command that gov-
ernment acts be "neutral and of general applicability" essentially imports the Court's intent 
requirement from the equal protection disparate impact cases. In order to invalidate a gener-
ally applicable government act (in other words, an act which is not facially discriminatory), 
the Court requires a showing of nonneutrality or intentional discrimination. In the free exer-
cise case immediately following Smith, the Court relied on a showing of purposeful religious 
discrimination. Lukum~ 113 S. a. at 2227-30. Two justices relied on discriminatory state-
ments in the act's legislative history. Lukum~ 113 S. Ct. at 2230-31 (opinion of Kennedy, J., 
joined by Stevens, J.). 
202 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:191 
feet of burdening a particular religious practice need not be justified 
by a compelling governmental interest is the only approach compati-
ble with these [equal protection] precedents.48 
The first free exercise case decided after Smith, Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 49 applied strict scrutiny 
to invalidate an ordinance passed by the City of Hialeah, Florida 
which outlawed ritualistic animal sacrifice.50 The law was passed in 
response to the arrival in Hialeah of a Santeria Church.s1 Lukumi 
restated the rule that intentional religious discrimination is re-
viewed under strict scrutiny,52 thereby establishing that strict scru-
tiny was still applicable under the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment after Smith. 
The Court has also applied strict scrutiny to intentional govern-
ment religious discrimination under the Establishment Clause. 
Larson v. Valente53 dealt with a Minnesota law that implemented a 
new tax structure that reserved certain tax benefits solely to reli-
gious organizations that received more than half of their total con-
tributions from members ("the fifty percent rule"). Prior to the 
fifty percent rule, all religious organizations had been tax exempt.54 
48. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3 (citations and emphasis omitted). 
49. 113 s. Ct. 2217 (1993). 
50. Lukumi did not rely upon a finding of facial discrimination. The Court stated that the 
statute's reference to "sacrifice" and "ritual" was not conclusively facial, because these words 
have secular as well as religious meanings. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2227. Instead, the Court 
searched for invidious intent by considering whether the law was (a) neutral and (b) of gen-
eral applicability. In finding that the law was not neutral, the Court looked to the circum-
stances surrounding the passage of the law and its language. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2227-31. 
The Court relied on similar findings of discriminatory intent in holding that the statute was 
not of general applicability. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2232-33. Once the Court decided that the 
law was not neutral or generally applicable, strict scrutiny was applied, and the law was held 
unconstitutional. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. ai 2233-34. 
Under both of Lukumi's inquiries the Court focused on the purpose of the law. Note that 
only two Justices supported reviewing the legislative history of the act. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 
2230-31 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Stevens, J.); cf. 113 S. Ct. at 2239 (Scalia, J., 
concurring, joined by Rehnquist, CJ.) (refusing to join Kennedy and Stevens in assessing the 
"subjective motivation of the lawmakers" but supporting exploration of the "object" of the 
law in assessing neutrality (emphasis omitted)). 
After Lukumi, Smith, and RFRA, the status of facially neutral religious discrimination is 
muddled. If a case involving a facially neutral law which impacts religious practices is 
brought under the RFRA, strict scrutiny is applied. If such a case is brought under the First 
Amendment, Smith and Lukumi suggest that if a discriminatory purpose can be found, strict 
scrutiny is applied. If the law is neutral, rational basis review is proper. Nevertheless, this 
controversy does not affect the status of intentional discrimination: it is reviewed under strict 
scrutiny. 
51. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2223-24. In the Santeria religion, "one of the principal forms of 
devotion is an animal sacrifice." Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2222. 
52. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2227 (holding that strict scrutiny applies if "the object or pur-
pose of a law is the suppression of religion or religious conduct"). 
53. 456 U.S. 228 (1982). 
54. Larson, 456 U.S. at 231. 
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The Supreme Court found that the :fifty _percent iule was a gov-
ernment act that favored certain religions (those· under the :fifty per-
cent cutoff) for tax purposes. The Court ruled that this preference 
constituted facial discrimination55 and applied strict scrutiny in in-
validating the statute: 
The clearest command of the Establishment Clause [of the First 
Amendment] is that one religious denomination cannot be officially 
preferred over another . 
. . . The First Amendment mandates governm.ental neutrality be-
tween religion and religion . . . . The State may not adopt programs or 
practices ... which 'aid or oppose' any religion .... This prohibition is 
absolute .... In short, when we are presented with a state law granting 
a denominational preference, our precedents demand that we treat 
the law as suspect and that we apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its 
constitutionality.56 
The above passage emphasizes the importance of the First Amend-
ment's guarantee of religious neutrality and the role that the strict 
scrutiny standard plays in protecting that right. Further, Larson, 
Smith, and Lukumi are all clear on the proposition that under 
either the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause, gov-
ernment acts which intentionally discriminate among religions are 
strictly scrutinized.s7 
B. Strict Scrutiny and the Assessment of Peremptory Challenges 
The conclusfon that governmental religious discrimination must 
be strictly scrutinized is especially warranted for the peremptory 
challenge because the Court has repeatedly stressed the need for 
governmental religious neutrality in the selection 'of public offi-
cials.ss Th.is command of government neutrality is directly applica-
ble to the selection of jury members. The Court has characterized 
55. Larson, 456 U.S. at 246-47 & n.23. The Cotirt explicitly rejected the argument that 
the statute was "a facially neutral statute, the provisions of which happen to have a disparate 
impact upon different religious organizations. On the contrary [the statute] makes explicit 
and deliberate distinctions between different religious orgahlzations." Larson, 456 U.S. at 
247 n.23. · 
56, Larson, 456 U.S. at 244, 246 (citations omitted). _ 
57. Larson recognized that governmental religious discrimination violated either clause 
of the First Amendment and that under both clauses strict scrutiny was necessary. "This 
constitutional prohibition of denominational preferences is inextricably connected with the 
continuing vitality of the Free Exercise Clause." Larson, 456 U.S. at 245. 
58. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 246; McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626-29 (1978); Torcaso v. 
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 {1961). Both Torcaso and McDaniel state the proposition that 
the government must be neutral among religions in the selection of public officials. In Tor-
caso, the Court struck down Article 37 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Consti-
tution which required an oath of belief in God to serve in public office. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 
489. The Court stated that the Government may not "pass laws which aid one religion, aid all 
religions, or prefer one religion over another." Torcaso, 367 U.S. at _493. Nor can the Gov-
ernment "pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, 
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jury service as a public office.59 In exercising a peremptory chal-
lenge, a litigant is a state actor choosing state officials. Thus, the 
First Amendment guarantees religious neutrality in this selection 
procedure, and any facial violation of that neutrality must be 
strictly scrutinized. 60 
m. STrucr ScRUTINY UNDER THE EouAL PRoTEcnoN CLAusE 
Government acts which distinguish among persons on the basis 
of religion also trigger strict scrutiny review under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. There are no equal protection cases which have di-
rectly applied strict scrutiny to government classifications among 
religions. This omission is traceable to the fact that religious dis-
crimination cases have traditionally been decided under the First 
Amendment.61 
Historically there have been two types of government classifica-
tions reviewed under strict scrutiny: those that classify persons on 
the basis of their exercise of a "fundamental right" and those that 
affect a suspect class.62 Section III.A argues that religious groups 
are a suspect class, and section ID.B argues that the practice of reli-
gion is a fundamental right. 
and neither can [it] aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against 
those religions founded on different beliefs." Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495. 
A similar statute was struck down in McDaniel. A plurality of the Court applied strict 
scrutiny and invalidated the statute. See McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626 (" '(T]o condition the 
availability of benefits, [including access to the ballot] upon this appellant's ••• religious faith 
•.. effectively penalizes the free exercise of [his] constitutional liberties.'" (quoting Sherbert 
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963))). In his concurrence, Justice Brennan stated: "[The 
Tennessee provision] establishes a religious classification - involvement in protected reli-
gious activity - governing the eligibility for office, which I believe is absolutely prohibited." 
McDanie~ 435 U.S. at 632 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
59. "The peremptory challenge is used in selecting an entity that is a quintessential gov-
ernmental body . . . . The jury exercises the power of the court and of the government that 
confers the court's jurisdiction." Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624 
(1991); see also Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 51-54 (1992). 
60. Torcaso and McDaniel also discuss the benefits associated with serving in a public 
office. The Court's recent peremptory challenge cases have all emphasized the significant 
benefits to a potential juror of jury service. In Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), the Court 
spoke at length about these benefits: 
Jury service . . . "affords ordinary citizens a valuable opportunity to participate in a 
process of government, an experience fostering, one hopes, a respect for law." Indeed, 
with the exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is 
their most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process. 
Powers, 499 U.S. at 407. (citation omitted). The right to serve on a jury is a "duty, honor, and 
privilege," Powers, 499 U.S. at 415, and as such, discrimination among religions in the grant-
ing of this benefit is a violation of the First Amendment's guarantee of religious neutrality. 
61. Such classifications receive strict scrutiny when reviewed under the First Amendment. 
See supra section II.A. 
62. "[E]qual protection analysis requires strict scrutiny .•• when the classification imper-
missibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disad-
vantage of a suspect class." Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 
(1976) (footnotes omitted); see also TRIBE, supra note 17, §§ 16-7, 16-13. 
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A. Religious Affiliation Is a Suspect Classification 
The Court has defined suspect classes as those groups "saddled 
with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful 
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of powerlessness 
as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian 
political process."63 Certain religious groups fit this definition 
because of America's unfortunate history of religious 
discrimination.64 
Furthermore, since the Court first considered heightened scru-
tiny for suspect classifications in footnote four of United States v. 
Carolene Products Co., the Court has listed religion along with race 
as a suspect category.65 More recently, the Court has recognized 
that strict scrutiny is applied when "inherently suspect distinctions 
such as race, religion, or alienage" are involved.66 Therefore, reli-
gious affiliation is a suspect classification, and government acts that 
distinguish among persons on the basis of religion must be strictly 
scrutinized.67 
In applying this analysis to peremptory challenges, however, 
there is a question whether a specific history of discrimination in 
jury selection must be proven. Language in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex 
rel. T.B. suggests that a history of discrimination against a particular 
group in jury selection may be necessary to extend Batson beyond 
63. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
64. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S.1, 8-14 (1947) (detailing the history of religious 
discrimination in America); MORTON BORDEN, JEWS, TURKS, AND INFIDELS (1984); JOEL 
FETZER, SELECI1VE PROSECUTION OF RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED OFFENDERS IN AMERICA 
(1989); GUSTAVUS MYERS, HISTORY OF BIGOTRY IN THE UNITED STATES (1943); HAROLD E. 
QUINLEY & CHARLEs Y. GLOCK, ANTI·SEMIDSM IN AMERICA (1979}; ANTI·SEMITISM IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY (David A. Gerber ed., 1986). Of course, religious discrimination con-
tinues today. For example, five state constitutions still require a belief in God as a prerequi-
site to serving in public office thirty-five years after such provisions were ruled 
unconstitutional in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). See Mo. CONST. art. XXXVI; 
PA. CONST. art I, § 4; S.C. CoNST. art. VI, § 2; TENN. CoNST. art IX, § 2; TEX. CoNST. art. I, 
§ 4. See generally EDD DoERR & ALBERT J. MENENDEZ, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND STATE 
CoNSTITUTIONS 15-16 (1993). 
65. See 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (holding that heightened scrutiny is appropriate for 
"statutes directed at particular religious, or national or racial minorities" (citations omitted}). 
66. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 885 (1985) (quoting New Orle-
ans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)). 
67. This statement directly contradicts a recent Ohio state court decision concerning 
religion·based peremptory challenges, State v. Lundgren, Nos. 90·L-15-140; 91-L-036, 1993 
WL 346444 (Ohio Ct App. Sept 14, 1993), affd., 653 N.E2d 304 {1995). Lundgren stated 
that Batson should not be extended to religion because there is no analogy between religion 
and race. Lundgren, 1993 WL 346444, at *39. The Ohio court based this holding upon the 
statement that religion is not a suspect class for equal protection purposes. See Lundgren, 
1993 WL 346444, at *39. 
The basis for Lundgren has been undermined by the preceding discussion. First, section 
III.A shows that religion is a suspect class under equal protection. Second, the court ignores 
the fundamental right to governmental religious neutrality under the Equal Protection 
Clause and the First Amendment 
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race.68 Both J.E.B. and Batson cite to a specific history of discrimi-
nation in jury selection - against women and minorities respec-
tively - that cannot be similarly documented in the area of 
religion.69 The Minnesota Supreme Court cited this lack of a his-
tory of religious discrimination in jury selection in refusing to ex-
pand Batson to religion.10 
There are several reasons why this lack of history is not fatal to 
a claim that religion-based peremptory challenges should be re-
viewed under strict scrutiny. First, unlike gender or race, religion 
has always had the First Amendment to ensure government reli-
gious neutrality. Consequently, there could be no religious discrim-
ination mandated by statutes similar to those denying jury 
participation to blacks71 and women.12 
Second, J.E.B. states as bases for its decision both a specific his-
tory of discrimination against women in jury selection and a general 
" 'long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination,' a history 
which warrants the heightened scrutiny we afford all gender based 
classifications today."73 Although religion lacks a specific history of 
jury discrimination, a similar unfortunate general history of reli-
68. J.E.B. states: 
While the prejudicial attitudes toward women in this country have not been identical 
to those held toward racial minorities, the similarities between the experiences of racial 
minorities and women, in some contexts, "overpower those differences." ..• Certainly, 
with respect to jury service, African-Americans and women share a history of total ex-
clusion, a history which came to an end for women many years after the embarrassing 
chapter in our history came to an end for African-Americans. 
We need not determine, however, whether women or racial minorities have suffered 
more at the hands of discriminatory state actors during the decades of our Nation's his-
tory. It is necessary only to acknowledge that "our Nation has had a long and unfortu-
nate history of sex discrimination," a history which warrants the heightened scrutiny we 
afford all gender-based classifications today. 
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1425 (1994) (citations omitted) (quoting Fron-
tiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973)). 
69. J.E.B. cites a history of gender discrimination in jury service. See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 
1424 (citing Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (holding that women could not be 
excluded from the venire in federal trials in states where women were eligible for jury ser-
vice), and Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 {1975) (striking down a statute which exempted 
women from jury service under the Sixth Amendment)). Batson cites a similar history of 
race discrimination in jury service. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84-87 (1986) (citing 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (holding the exclusion of black citizens as 
jurors unconstitutional); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906) (holding that criminal defend-
ants have a right to be tried by a jury selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria); and 
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (holding unconstitutional the assumption that mem-
bers of the black race are not qualified to serve as jurors)); see also Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 618 (1991) ("Powers relied upon over a century of jurisprudence 
dedicated to the elimination of race prejudice within the jury selection process."). 
70. State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994) 
(reading the Supreme Court peremptory challenge jurisprudence to require religion-based 
discrimination to be a historical and systematic illness in the jury selection process). 
71. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
72. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
73. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425 (citation omitted). 
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gious discrimination exists in the United States, a history which jus-
tifi.es treating religion as a suspect classifi.cation.74 
Finally, given the Court's focus upon the potential juror's consti-
tutional right to nondiscrimination in jury selection, the question of 
a history of discrimination in jury selection seems misguided. The 
fundamental question is whether the equal protection rights of the 
juror at issue have been violated, and a history of discrimination is 
simply irrelevant to this question. As J.E.B. stated: "the exclusion 
of even one juror for impermissible reasons harms that juror and 
undermines public confidence in the fairness of the system."75 Any 
requirement of systematic violations was overruled when Batson re-
placed the strictures of Swain v. Alabama. 16 
B. Free Exercise of Religion Is a Fundamental Right 
The Equal Protection Clause also demands strict scrutiny when 
state action impinges upon a fundamental right. Fundamental 
rights are those which are "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the 
Constitution."77 The Court has stated that "[u]nquestionably, the 
free exercise of religion is a fundamental constitutional right."78 
Government classifi.cations which burden the practice of a funda-
mental right are to be strictly scrutinized.79 A government religious 
classifi.cation which results in members of a religion being denied 
the opportunity to serve on a jury clearly constitutes a "burden" on 
the free exercise of that religion. 
74. See supra note 64. 
75. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1428 n.14; see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 {1986) ("'[A] 
consistent pattern of official racial discrimination' is not 'a necessary predicate to a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause. A single invidiously discriminatory governmental act' is not 
'immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable deci-
sions.'" (citations omitted)). 
76. See supra notes 18-19. Swain required a pattern of discriminatory peremptory chal-
lenges before any peremptories could be found unconstitutional. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 
202, 223-25 (1965). Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986), overruled this requirement 
and held that any single peremptory challenge could be found improper. 
77. San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). Examples of 
implied fundamental rights are the right to interstate travel, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 
745, 757-59 {1966), the right to privacy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 {1973), and the 
right to marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
78. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974). 
79. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2813-33 {1992) (applying strict 
scrutiny to possible violations of a woman's fundamental liberty interest in terminating preg-
nancy); Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666-67 (1990) (hold-
ing strict scrutiny review necessary to analyze an abridgement of the First Amendment right 
to political expression); Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S. 360, 366 (1988); Massachusetts 
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (strict scrutiny review applies to viola-
tions of a fundamental right); see also TRIBE, supra note 17, § 16-7 ("Legislative and adminis-
trative classifications are to be strictly scrutinized and thus held unconstitutional absent a 
compelling governmental interest if they distribute benefits or burdens in a manner inconsis-
tent with fundamental rights."). 
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IV. STRICT SCRUTINY ANALYSIS 
Parts II and III argued separately that under either the First 
Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause, strict scrutiny should 
be applied to religion-based peremptory challenges. As stated in 
Part II, the analysis of facial religious discrimination under the First 
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause is now essentially the 
same. As Justice O'Connor stated: 
[An] emphasis on equal treatment is, I think, an eminently sound ap-
proach. In my view, the Religion Clauses - the Free Exercise 
Clause, the Religious Test Clause,B0 and the Equal Protection Clause 
... all speak with one voice on this point: Absent the most unusual 
circumstances, one's religion ought not affect one's legal rights or du-
ties or benefits.Bl 
This Part applies strict scrutiny review to religion-based per-
emptory challenges and concludes that they are unconstitutional. 
Under either First Amendment or Equal Protection analysis, the 
strict scrutiny standard is the same: the law or practice at issue 
must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government inter-
est.82 Religion-based peremptory challenges are a form of religious 
discrimination and are subject to strict scrutiny. 
Religion-based peremptory challenges pass the first prong of 
strict scrutiny; they are "justified by a compelling government inter-
est. "B3 As J.E.B. recognized, the government's "legitimate interest" 
in providing a fair and impartial trial is sufficiently compelling to 
pass the first requirement of strict scrutiny.84 The necessary ques-
tion, therefore, is how effective religion-based peremptory chal-
lenges are in guaranteeing a fair trial.BS Section IV.A argues that 
religion-based peremptory challenges are not sufficiently narrowly 
80. Article VI of the Constitution states: "[N]o religious test shall ever be required as a 
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States." U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
81. Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2497 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) 
(citation omitted). 
82. Compare Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 247 (1982) (holding under the First Amend-
ment that "rule must be invalidated unless it is justified by a compelling government interest, 
and unless it is closely fitted to further that interest" (citations omitted)) with Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279-80 (1986) (holding under the Equal Protection 
Clause that "[t]o pass constitutional muster racial classifications must be necessary to the 
accomplishment of their legitimate purpose ••• [and] narrowly tailored to the achievement of 
that goal" (citations omitted)). 
83. Larson, 456 U.S. at 247; see Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 
113 S. Ct 2217, 2233 (1993) ("[A] law restrictive of religious practice must advance 'interests 
of the highest order.'" (citation omitted)). 
84. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1425 (1994). 
85. The J.E.B. Court recognized the centrality of this question: 
In making this assessment, we do not weigh the value of peremptory challenges as an 
institution against our asserted commitment to eradicate invidious discrimination from 
the courtroom. Instead we consider whether peremptory challenges based on gender 
stereotypes provide substantial aid to a litigant's effort to secure a fair and impartial jury. 
114 S. Ct. at 1425-26. 
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tailored to survive strict scrutiny because they are based on stere-
otypical assumptions about religious views. Section IV.B argues 
that religion-based peremptory challenges are not narrowly tailored 
because there is a less restrictive alternative: litigants could focus 
on actually ascertained beliefs of potential jurors instead of mere 
religious affiliation. 
A. Narrow Tailoring 
The constitutionality of religion-based peremptory challenges 
depends on whether they are narrowly tailored to achieve the legiti-
mate goal of supplying a fair trial. In assessing the effectiveness of 
gender-based peremptory challenges, J.E.B. cited juror studies on 
the connection between gender and jury behavior. The Court con-
cluded that there was "virtually no support for the conclusion that 
gender alone is an accurate predictor of juror's attitudes."86 The 
data concerning religious affiliation and jury behavior is even less 
well-developed than that concerning gender, and the available stud-
ies provide no support for the claim that religious affiliation alone is 
an accurate predictor of juror attitudes.87 
Religion-based peremptory challenges violate strict scrutiny be-
cause they depend on stereotypical assumptions. Stereotypes with-
out any statistical evidence cannot withstand strict scrutiny.ss The 
religious stereotypes which have been used as proxies for juror be-
havior are similar to the gender stereotypes described in J.E.B. 89 
86. 114 s. a. at 1426-27. 
87. See REID HAsnE ET AL., INSIDE THE JUROR 124 {1983) (stating that while some social 
scientists have concluded that religion, among several other factors, may have an effect in 
certain cases, there is little scientific evidence that religion makes any difference in trial 
outcomes). 
According to Professor Abbott, the "basic" factors in anticipating juror behavior are age, 
sex, race, occupation, marital status, and spouse's occupation. WALTER F. ABBOT!', ANA-
LYTIC JUROR RATER § 4.02 (1987). The supplementary predictors are residential location, 
socio-economic status, presidential and party choices, religious identity and attendance prac-
tices, and attitudinal and lifestyle factors. Id. § 4.03. These factors can be used to find out 
whether the juror is an authoritarian personality or not, which can be a predicting factor. 
"Extreme Authoritarianism as a personality type has been variously linked with ••• orthodox 
religious beliefs ..•. " Id. § 6.05(c). Religion was listed along with nine other indicia of ex-
treme authoritarianism. Abbott asserts that "authoritarians are typically more inclined to 
convict" but also cites a study stating the exact opposite conclusion. Id. § 6.05(c). 
The evidence regarding religion as a factor in jury behavior is meager and inconclusive at 
best, and religion has never been shown to be an accurate predictor. 
88. See J.E.B., 114 S. a. at 1426-27. 
89. See J.E.B., 114 S. a. at 1427 n.10. Professor Abramson provides an example of reli-
gious stereotyping in jury selection: 
In a 1936 article for Esquire magazine, Clarence Darrow divided religions and ethnic 
groups into the prodefense and proprosecution camps. Favorable to defendants were 
Irish, Jews, Unitarians, Universalists, Congregationalists, and agnostics. The ideal prose-
cution juror had high regard for the law and a religious attitude toward sin and punish-
ment, qualities found among Scandinavians in particular but also among Lutherans, 
Baptists, and Presbyterians. 
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The government has an interest in guaranteeing a fair trial, but the 
lack of evidence supporting religion-based peremptory challenges' 
role in supplying an impartial jury leads to the conclusion that such 
peremptories are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to fit the gov-
ernmental interest. 
B. A Less Restrictive Alternative 
This section argues that courts can better serve the government 
interest of supplying a fair trial and better protect the rights of po-
tential jurors by requiring a showing of the potential juror's actual 
beliefs, rather than mere religious affiliation, before removing any 
juror for potential bias. 
An analysis of whether a government policy is "narrowly tai-
lored" requires consideration of whether lawful and less-restrictive 
means are available.9o Peremptory challenges based solely on reli-
gious affiliation are not narrowly tailored because they are both un-
derinclusive and overinclusive. They are underinclusive insofar as 
challenges on the basis of religious affiliation overlook nonreligious 
potential jurors who may hold beliefs similar to those of a religious 
potential juror. They are overinclusive because not every member 
of a religious sect believes every tenet of that faith, so challenges on 
the basis of religious affiliation remove jurors who may not actually 
hold the potential bias. 
A focus on actually ascertained beliefs is a lawful and less re-
strictive means for ascertaining juror bias. This can be stated as a 
constitutional command to "ask the second question." Litigants 
should inquire as to what the actual beliefs of the juror are before 
Similarly, a 1935 trial manual provided lawyers with a scale for rating fiurors] ••.. In 
medical malpractice cases ... the plaintiff was warned away from Jewish jurors because 
"most Jews want their sons to become doctors ••. and they want their daughters to 
marry doctors." 
JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, TIIE JURY 147 (1994) {footnotes omitted). For a particularly bi-
zarre example of religious stereotyping in the use of the peremptory challenge, consider the 
Marcos-Khashoggi trial. Imelda Marcos, wife of the ex-President of the Philippines, and 
Adnan Khashoggi, an Arab businessman and arms-dealer, were on the same side at trial, yet 
Khashoggi's lawyers wanted to eliminate Jewish potential jurors because of supposed anti-
Arab bias, while Marcos's lawyers thought Jewish jurors would be ideal because Jews are 
"sensitive to persecution and suspicious of government power." See STEVEN J. ADLER, THE 
JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN TIIE AMERICAN COURTROOM 57-58 (1994). 
90. The Court explained: 
The term "narrowly tailored" ••. may be used to require consideration of whether 
lawful alternative and less restrictive means could have been used. Or, as Professor Ely 
has noted, the classification at issue must "fit" with greater precision than any alterna-
tive means. "Courts should give particularly intense scrutiny to whether a nonracial 
approach or a more narrowly-tailored racial cla~sification could promote the substantial 
interest about as well and at tolerable administrative expense." 
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 {1986) (citations omitted} (quoting 
Kent Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 
75 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 578-579 {1975)). 
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any challenge would be constitutionally permissible.91 There is a 
fundamental distinction between religious affiliation and actually 
ascertained religious beliefs. Even if the peremptory challenge is 
based upon the presumed religious views of the juror and not upon 
any prejudice, not every member of a religion will agree with all of 
the tenets of that religion. Consider the division among Catholics 
on the issue of abortion. Assuming that any and all Catholics are 
pro-life would not be a fair treatment of Catholic potential jurors in 
a case where abortion was at issue. 
If the voir dire establishes that a juror's religious beliefs will bias 
her significantly in a particular case, then a removal for cause is 
proper.92 Even if the religious belief at issue cannot satisfy the 
higher standard of a challenge for cause, however, the potential ju-
ror still may be subject to a peremptory challenge on the basis of an 
actually held belief rather than solely on the basis of a religious 
affiliation. If a litigant can establish that a potential juror's religious 
views may bias the juror, then the litigant has provided a neutral 
explanation, and the peremptory challenge should be upheld. 
The distinction between group affiliation and actual bias is 
found in both Batson and J.E.B. These cases held that biased no-
tions of either race or sex cannot act as a neutral explanation but 
91. The importance of this differential between mere knowledge of religious affiliation 
and actual knowledge of religious beliefs is underscored by the First Amendment analysis in 
Part II. If the Government must remain absolutely religiously neutral in the selection of 
public officials, then not only are peremptory challenges on the basis of religious affiliation 
unconstitutional, but so are peremptories on the basis of actual religious beliefs, and arguably 
even removals for cause that impact a religious belief. 
The argument should not be stretched to this extent. First, challenges - whether per-
emptory or for cause - based on actual beliefs are neutral as to religion and therefore dispa-
rately impact religious belief. For example, if a lawyer removes all potential jurors who are 
pro-life from the trial of an abortion clinic bombing, this action may disparately impact cer-
tain religious affiliations. The act is neutral, however, because the lawyer is removing poten-
tial jurors on the basis of a nonreligious belief that any member of the venire may share. 
Assuming that the litigant does remove all pro-life jurors regardless of religious affiliation, 
such a peremptory challenge is based on actual beliefs of the jurors, and the government act 
is religion-neutral. A neutral government act would fall under Employment Division v. Smith 
and would not be strictly scrutinized. See supra text accompanying notes 42-48. 
Second, even if a challenge {whether peremptory or for cause) based on actually held 
beliefs were strictly scrutinized, the challenge would pass. The government's interest in a fair 
and impartial trial would necessarily be hampered by a rule that forced the litigants to accept 
a juror, no matter how biased his or her beliefs were, simply because the juror's beliefs were 
religious beliefs. 
Furthermore, this "second question" approach also answers the claims of religion-based 
peremptory challenge proponents that such challenges differ from peremptories based on 
race or gender because there is a significantly greater correspondence between religious affil-
iation and beliefs than between race or gender and beliefs. See Casarez v. Texas, No. 1114-
93, 1994 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 140 at *73-79 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 1994) (Meyers, J., 
dissenting); J. Suzanne Bell Chambers, Note, Applying the Break: Religion and the Peremp-
tory Challenge, 10 IND. L.J. 569, 595-97 (1995). Even if there is an incrementally better cor-
respondence, there is no argument that it would work better than actually ascertaining the 
potential juror's beliefs through substantive questioning. 
92. For a discussion of challenges for cause, see supra note 2. 
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emphasized that a peremptory challenge is proper if a juror actually 
holds prejudicial beliefs.93 The same distinction should be made be-
tween religious beliefs which are actually held and beliefs which are 
presumed on the basis of religious affiliation. Therefore, absent a 
showing of pretext, a juror may be removed on the basis of personal 
religious beliefs when voir dire has established that the juror actu-
ally holds those beliefs. 
This Note's approach also comports with the Court's treatment 
of the strict scrutiny requirement that the government classification 
be narrowly tailored. A peremptory challenge based upon a poten-
tial juror's identified beliefs rather than religious affiliation would 
constitute a significantly better constitutional fit. An approach that 
established the necessity of asking the second question would better 
promote the government's interest in a fair trial and avoid violation 
of the constitutional rights of the excluded juror.94 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF ELIMINATING RELIGION-BASED 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
This Part discusses the practical implications of eliminating 
religion-based peremptories and argues that these implications do 
not present a significant obstacle to an extension of Batson to 
religion. 
Section V.A rebuts the objection that extending Batson to reli-
gion will result in the eventual demise of the peremptory challenge. 
Section V.B discusses and rejects the objection that the Batson test 
has been relatively unsuccessful in stemming race discrimination in 
jury selection, and therefore extending Batson to religion offers no 
help to religion or race. 
93. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1429 (1994); Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (1986). The distinction between a belief presumed on the basis of race and 
a belief actually held was also emphasized by the Court in Georgia v. McCollum: 
We have, accordingly, held that there should be a mechanism for removing those on the 
venire whom the defendant has specified reason to believe would be incapable of con-
fronting and suppressing their racism. 
But there is a distinction between exercising a peremptory challenge to discriminate 
invidiously against jurors on account of race and exercising a peremptory challenge to 
remove an individual juror who harbors racial prejudice. 
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 58-59 (1992) (citations omitted). 
94. Such an inquiry would only be proper if the religious views of the juror might consti-
tute a bias. In the majority of cases, religious affiliation is simply irrelevant. The irrelevance 
of religion to jury service has been recognized at common law: 
Ordinarily at common law, inquiry on voir dire into a juror's religious affiliation and 
beliefs is irrelevant and prejudicial, and to ask such questions is improper. Questions 
about religious beliefs are relevant only if pertinent to religious issues involved in the 
case, or if a religious organization is a party, or if the information is a necessary predi-
cate for a voir dire challenge. 
State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 772 (Minn. 1993) (citing Coleman v. United States, 379 A.2d 
951, 954 (D.C. 1977), and United States v. Schullo, 390 F. Supp. 1067 (D. Minn. 1975)). 
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A. Preservation of Peremptory Challenges 
Eliminating religion-based peremptory challenges will have a 
narrow effect and will not result in the elimination of peremptory 
challenges altogether. Ever since the Court began requiring 
nondiscriminatory explanations for certain peremptory challenges, 
judges and commentators alike have argued that Batson has re-
sulted in the de facto end of the peremptory challenge, because the 
peremptory has traditionally been wholly unexplained.95 These ar-
guments apply equally to any extension of Batson: the more cir-
cumstances that are included, the less unexplained the peremptory 
becomes.96 
First, the argument against expanding Batson has already been 
lost by its extension to gender in J.E.B. Further, the concern that 
this expansion would engulf any and all group affiliations was spe-
cifically denied by J.E.B., which stated that "[p]arties may also ex-
ercise their peremptory challenges to remove from the venire any 
group or class of individuals normally subject to 'rational basis' re-
view."97 Therefore, the debate is limited only to those groups that 
95. This argument began in Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Batson, 416 U.S. at 124 (ar-
guing that the majority decision signaled the eventual end of the peremptory challenge). 
Note that Justice Marshall's concurrence in Batson argued explicitly for eradicating the 
peremptory challenge altogether, 476 U.S. at 102-8 (arguing that under equal protection 
analysis, the proper remedy is the elimination the peremptory challenge altogether). 
Commentators have argued for abolishing the peremptory challenge as well. See 
Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. 
REv. 369 {1992); Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Role of 
the Jury, 73 TEXAS L. REv. 1041 {1995); Jeffrey Toobin, Juries on Trial, THE NEw YORKER, 
Oct. 31, 1994, at 42 (arguing for the elimination of the peremptory challenge); cf. Robert M. 
O'Connell, Note, The Elimination of Racism from Jury Selection, Challenging the Peremptory 
Challenge, 32 B.C. L. REv. 433 {1991) (arguing that any peremptory challenges that conflict 
with principles of equal protection must be eliminated). 
Others have advocated peremptories because of their efficacy. See Barbara Allen 
Babcock, Jury Service and Community Representation, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL 
JURY SYSTEM 460, 479 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); John C. Blattner, Book Notice, Courts 
and Constitutions, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1363, 1369-71 (1995) (reviewing STEVEN J. ADLER, THE 
JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN CoURTROOM (1994)); J. Suzanne Bell 
Chambers, Note, Applying the Break: Religion and the Peremptory Challenge, 10 IND. L.J. 
569, 573-76 (1995). 
96. One commentator stated: 
The claim that the [Batson] rule is in hopeless conflict with the [peremptory] challenge is 
frequently linked to the suggestion that the ban on jury discrimination must inevitably 
expand to prohibit not only jury selection based on race, but also jury selection based on 
religion, national origin, gender, language, disability, age, occupation, political party, and 
a host of other categories. The relationship between the two points is clear: the longer 
the list of prohibited categories, the less room there is for a lawful challenge other than a 
challenge for cause. 
Underwood, supra note 28, at 761 (footnote omitted). 
97. J.E.B., 114 S. a. at 1429. Examples of group affiliations subject to rational basis 
review are: mental retardation, see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 
U.S. 432, 446 (1985); wealth, see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1977); age, see Massa-
chusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976); and occupation, see Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955). 
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receive some level of heightened scrutiny under equal protection. 
Among the recognized groups that receive heightened scrutiny, 
only religion has yet to be invalidated as a basis for peremptory 
challenges. 
Second, religion is an infrequent basis for peremptory chal-
lenges,98 and invalidating such peremptories would have a much 
smaller impact than the invalidation of race- or gender-based per-
emptories. Under the common law, voir-dire questions concerning 
a potential juror's religious affiliation are proscribed as prejudicial 
and irrelevant.99 Therefore, litigants generally will not even know 
the religious affiliation of the potential jurors, and the occurrence 
of religion-based peremptories will be infrequent. 
B. Batson's Ineffectiveness in Practice 
Despite the potential practical difficulties of eliminating discrim-
ination in the use of the peremptory challenge, whether aimed at 
race, sex, or religion, the strictures of the Equal Protection Clause 
should be applied, and Batson should be extended. State and fed-
eral courts have had difficulties applying Batson's three-part test, 
and these difficulties must be considered in any discussion of an 
expansion of Batson to religion. Some commentators argue that 
the neutral explanations that courts have accepted after Batson ob-
jections are so numerous that Batson has become a virtual. sieve.100 
It is unclear whether the difficulty lies with the Batson test itself or 
with hostility by the courts to Batson. Nonetheless, in eliminating 
only the most egregious examples of race discrimination, the Batson 
test has failed to cure racism in the jury selection process. The 
same Batson test is applied to gender-based peremptories under 
98. A survey of over 2,000 state and federal Batson cases found that "[i]n only a handful 
of the cases we studied did the prosecutor offer a neutral explanation based upon religion." 
Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 21, at 246. 
99. State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 772 (1993). For a quotation from Davis concerning 
this common law rule, see supra note 94. 
100. Consider the following from Raphael and Ungvarsky: 
A prosecutor who wishes to rebut the prima facie case does not face a significant 
challenge. In our data, only a small percentage of the neutral explanations for peremp-
tory strikes were rejected. Indeed, those explanations that were rejected often involved 
the clearest cases of Batson violations, such as prosecutors who explained that they 
struck the juror based on race or prosecutors who gave no reason for striking the ju-
ror .... These cases intimate that courts are often uncritical in evaluating neutral expla· 
nations. In fact, our research demonstrates that in almost any situation a prosecutor can 
readily craft an acceptable neutral explanation to justify striking black jurors because of 
their race. 
Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 21, at 235-36 (citations omitted). 
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J.E.B. 10 1 and would almost certainly be the test applied for religion-
based peremptory challenges.102 
It should be noted, however, that extending Batson to religion 
may actually help in solving the problems experienced under the 
Batson test by eliminating a formerly neutral explanation. In ex-
tending Batson to gender in J.E.B., the Court stated: 
Failing to provide jurors the same protection against gender discrimi-
nation as race discrimination could frustrate the purpose of Batson 
itself. Because gender and race are overlapping categories, gender 
can be used as a pretext for racial discrimination. Allowing parties to 
remove racial minorities from the jury not because of their race, but 
because of their gender, contravenes well-established equal protec-
tion principles and could insulate effectively racial discrimination 
from judicial scrutiny.103 
The above rationale applies equally to peremptories on the basis of 
religion, which overlaps both race and gender. As long as religion-
based peremptories are permitted, they will serve to shield both 
race and gender discrimination. Furthermore, as with gender dis-
crimination in J.E.B., the majority of religion-based peremptory 
challenge cases arose as race-neutral explanations for "the use of 
the peremptory challenge to remove minorit[ies]."104 As courts be-
101. See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429-30. The Batson test is also applied under Georgia v. 
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 
(1991); and Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991). 
102. It is not within the scope of this Note to argue a new standard for the Batson test, 
although several commentators have made sensible suggestions. Raphael & Ungvarsky ad-
vocate a four-part test of neutrality: 
The trial court must (A) independently confirm the basis of the explanation; (B) affirm-
atively find that any_ other jurors with similar characteristics to the challenged juror·were 
struck; (C) determine that an explanation based on characterizations of a group which 
includes a juror be shown specifically true of the challenged juror; and (D) find that an 
explanation is rational, meaningful, and related to the particular case. 
Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 21, at 268; see also Paul H. Schwartz, Comment, Equal 
Protection in Jury Selection? The Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky in North Carolina, 
69 N.C. L. REv. 1533, 1566 n.304 (1991) (arguing that "vague and highly subjective" explana-
tions be rejected); Joshua E. Swift, Note, Batson's Invidious Legacy: Discriminatory Juror 
Exclusion and the "Intuitive" Peremptory Challenge, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 336, 361-66 (1993) 
(arguing for rejection of all explanations that cannot be confirmed by the record). 
All of these suggested Batson standards are consistent with this Note's emphasis on the 
distinction between mere knowledge of religious affiliation and the actual content of a venire 
person's religious beliefs. See supra section IV.B. 
103. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430 (footnotes omitted). 
104. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430 n.18. The religion-based peremptory challenge cases that 
have arisen out of objections on the basis of race discrimination are: United States v. Greer, 
939 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1991), vacated in part on rehg. en bane, 968 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1992), 
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1390 (1993); United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1157 (3d Cir. 
1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990); Joseph v. State, 636 So. 2d 777, 780-81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1994); People v. Malone, 570 N.E.2d 584, 588-89 (III. App. Ct. 1991); State v. Young, 
569 So. 2d 570, 578 (La. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Worthy, 532 So. 2d 541, 553 (La. Ct. App. 
1988); State v. Brown, 522 So. 2d 1110, 1114 (La. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 
767, 771 n.3 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994); Johnson v. State, 529 So. 2d 
577, 583 (Miss. 1988); State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 64 (Mo. 1987); State v. Lundgren, 
Nos. 90-L-15-140, 91-L-036, 1993 WL 346444 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1993), affd., 653 
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gin to apply J.E.B., religion can also be expected as a neutral expla-
nation used to justify gender discrimination. 
Insofar as extending Batson to religion is not helpful, the failure 
is attributable to Batson's three-part test and not the constitutional 
underpinnings of an argument for eliminating religion-based per-
emptory challenges. No one could fairly argue that because Bat-
son's three-part test has not been wholly effective, Batson should be 
overturned. Likewise, the difficulties associated with the test 
should not bar Batson's expansion to religion. · 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has argued that religion-based peremptory challenges 
are unconstitutional. This issue is important on more than an intel-
lectual level because Batson and its progeny represent an effort by 
the Court to end discrimination in jury selection: if courts refuse to 
extend the Batson doctrine to suspect classes besides race and gen-
der, this goal will not be reached. In the peremptory challenge 
cases, the Court was keenly sensitive to the fact that the discrimina-
tion occurred in the courthouse itself. The Court was particularly 
disturbed that the justice system required citizens to appear for jury 
service, only to subject them to discrimination at the hands of law-
yers acting as agents of the court. 
Furthermore, in J.E.B., the Court recognized that this harm was 
not limited to race; jurors removed on the basis of gender were no 
better off than those removed because of race. This reasoning must 
be extended to religion. Citizens summarily dismissed on the basis 
of their religion have suffered the same harm: they have been 
called to serve and then removed on unconstitutional grounds. As 
long as religion-based peremptory challenges remain, they, like 
race- and gender-based peremptory challenges before them, act as 
an unmistakable reminder that discrimination remains a fixture in 
our society, even within the walls of the courthouse. 
N.E.2d 304 {Ohio 1995); Casarez v. Texas, No. 1114-93, 1994 WL 695868 {Tex. Crim. App. 
Dec. 14, 1994); Grady v. State, 730 S.W.2d 191, 195 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); Chambers v. State, 
724 S.W.2d 440, 442 {Tex. Ct. App. 1987). 
